MAINTAINING THE EDGE: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT ARMY OFFICER RETENTION
As long as there are potential threats to the United States and our allies, we must ensure we have a military presence ready and willing to protect our country and all that it stands for. This means recruiting and retaining the best of the best. captains from primary year groups, 1999 -2005 in an effort to provide some temporary relief for its officer shortage problem. 2 3 Now, after more than 10 years of fighting with few budgetary constraints, the Army faces an environment where the Department of Defense (DOD) must cut more than $487 billion over the next 10 years as the country seeks to balance the budget. These cuts will significantly inhibit the effectiveness of many of the incentives and benefits previously offered to entice people to join -and more importantly -to remain in the United States Army as officers. Given a draw down where recruiting and retention incentives may be limited, the Army must develop a comprehensive strategy for recruiting and retaining its junior officers if it is to correct its officer retention problem and set the conditions for an adequately manned and equally talented officer corps prepared to meet the challenges and demands of the future.
An examination of this issue starts with an identification of the Army's officer shortage problem and an explanation of its significance. Next it looks at the initiatives taken to correct the problem and measures of their effectiveness. Finally, it will provide recommendations necessary to develop a strategic officer corps plan, despite impending budgetary constraints.
The Problem
For almost 40 years, the United States Army has relied on an all-volunteer force to defend the nation at home and abroad. Congress, under the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), authorizes total officer strength for the military services each year, considering the historical relationship between officer and enlisted personnel, stated manpower requirements, and the achievement of other servicespecific goals. 4 The annual accession target for officers is the number of new lieutenants that must be brought into the Army each year to ensure that an adequate number of officers are available to meet requirements over the 30-year life cycle of that year group. Accessing too few will, at some point on the life cycle continuum, result in a shortage while accessing too many may necessitate voluntary and involuntary separations under DOPMA. 5 According to a study conducted by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) for the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Congress expects the Army to develop a strategy to access, develop, retain and employ its officer corps at the appropriate ranks and occupational specialties necessary to meet their accession and retention needs. 6 For nearly two decades, the Army has failed to develop an integrated officer recruiting and retention strategy to ensure it will have the officer strength it needs. In fact, in a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, Charles Henning points out that "Officer shortages in excess of 3,000 annually are projected to persist through at least 2013." Initiative further challenged already under-accessed year groups by adding an 88% increase in the demand for captains and majors. 8 A third factor contributing to the Army's officer shortage is increased officer attrition rates for those completing their initial Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO). While none of these factors alone stand as the single cause of failure for the Army's officer shortage, when combined they pose a considerable challenge for the Army with no quick fix.
In a 6-part monograph conducted by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), authors Casey Wardynski, David Lyle and Michael Colarusso point out that Unlike corporate America, which can expand or contract relatively quickly, the Army's developmental structure and mission necessarily limits lateral entry. Consequently, it is unable to quickly grow in its mid-to-upper ranks requiring at least a decade or more years to develop these officers. 9 CRS also supports this finding that the Army's critical officer shortage is at the senior captain and major ranks. Since it takes 10 years to "grow" an officer to the rank of major (time from commissioning to promotion to major), this is not a problem that can be quickly or easily solved. 11 SSI's Wardynski, Lyle and Colarusso point out that "once the Army accesses a cohort of officers, it must live with them throughout a 30-year career span. This is because, unlike most enterprises, the Army cannot buy talent from elsewhere to fill shortfalls at its mid and upper-level ranks. The officer corps embodies a unique profession whose culture and core warfighting abilities take years to develop." 12 To truly appreciate the Army's officer shortage problem, it is necessary to look closer at each factor. Unlike the enlisted system, management of the Army's commissioned officer corps is a dynamic, highly visible and complex system that is significantly influenced by law and policy. The CRS summarizes that "All officers accessed to active duty during a fiscal year constitute a year group that will compete for promotion, school and command opportunities within the cohort as it progresses through a 30-year military career." 14 The end of the Cold war signaled the beginning of the Army's officer shortage problem. In the 1990s, the United States looked forward to reaping the benefits of the "peace dividend" from the fall of the Soviet Union. 33 The GAO report documented in 2007 that "the Army recognizes that offering more scholarships could improve its ROTC program accessions and has proposed increasing available scholarships. However, this is not part of a broader strategic plan that would realign resources to better meet the Army's officer accession needs and minimize risk." system. It is also necessary to maintain the rank structure as officers' advance. 39 According to the GAO report, Army officials initially reported that attrition levels among junior officers were consistent with historical trends; therefore attrition wasn't the problem. As mentioned earlier however, when under-accessions and an increase in officer manning requirements due to the Modular Force Initiative are included, normal attrition produces shortages. LTG Rochelle put this in perspective, "The 10-year historical loss rate for company grade officers is 8.5%. In FY06, the loss rate for company grade officers was 7.9%, which was below the historical norm. While this is encouraging, we must drop this loss rate to 5% to support the transformational Army." 40 Officers choose to join the Army for a variety of reasons; to serve their country, to gain a skill set, to see the world, or to pay for their education. They also choose to stay or depart for any number of reasons as well. Understanding these reasons is critical if the Army is serious about reducing its officer loss rate to 5%. To gain an appreciation of the problem, it is important to understand: 1) how long officers remain on active duty past their ADSO; 2) what type of officer leaves and who stays; and 3) the reasons why those who depart choose to do so.
SSI's research points out that the Army devotes billions of dollars to officer undergraduate-level education, world class training, and developmental experiences.
Since the late 1980s, however, prospects for the officer corps' future have been darkened by an ever-diminishing return on this investment, as company grade officer retention rates have plummeted. 41 Wardynski, Lyle and Colarusso's study on officer retention reveals several significant observations that require closer inspection.
The first looked at how long officers continue on active duty past their ADSO.
Their studies found that roughly 60% of the officers commissioned in the late 1970s through ROTC and West Point scholarship programs remained on active duty through eight years of service. This abundance of senior captains ensured manning requirements were filled by experienced officers allowing the Army to be selective on which ones were promoted to major. By the mid-1980s, however, only 40% of officers being commissioned from the same scholarship sources remained on active service through eight years. 42 Reasons behind the 20% loss in officer retention are attributed to the rise of information technology, the economy's increased appetite for highly-educated workers, and corporate America's aggressive talent recruitment campaign to draw talent away from the Army. 43 They next observed retention rates as a function of commissioning source analyzed against procurement programs. representative of all year groups in the 1990s. SSI discovered that ROTC four-year scholarship and West Point officers remained on active duty at the lowest rates, followed in order by three-year and two-year ROTC scholarship officers, nonscholarship ROTC officers, and OCS officers drawn from the enlisted ranks (OCS-IS). 45 Although not depicted in Figure 3 , officers commissioned through OCS-EO, which now comprise 50% of all OCS commissions, retain on active duty at even lower rates than West Point and four-year ROTC scholarship officers -the very population they were to leaven with higher continuation rates. 46 past an officer's ADSO is the lowest among those junior officers that the Army invested the most in.
The Army paid for the undergraduate education of these officers due to their demonstrated intelligence, leadership potential, and high aptitudes for learning Coupled with the education and training provided by the Army, these characteristics are in demand everywhere and are aggressively sought by outside employers. As these officers have the greatest range of employment options, they more often exercise those options when their Army careers fail to meet their expectations.
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The significance of ROTC scholarship and West Point officers departing the Army as soon as their ADSO requirements are met is that it has a direct impact on the quality of the Army's officer corps at its senior levels. report on their first OER in each duty position as well as battalion and brigade command selection rates. What they discovered when looking at population totals is the correlation between performance and Army resourcing -the higher the investment (West Point and ROTC three and four-year scholarship officers), the greater the mean performance. 49 In the face of impending budget constraints, it is imperative for the quality of the Army's officer corps that funding continue to be targeted towards ROTC scholarship and USMA -while simultaneously developing ways to increase officer retention of its most talented individuals. 93% of those surveyed believed that half or more of the best officers leave the military early rather than serving a full career. 54 Kane's conclusion was officers didn't leave because they could get a better job in the private sector. "The reason overwhelming cited by veterans and active duty officers alike is that the military personnel systemevery aspect of it -is nearly blind of merit." 55 He identifies performance evaluations that emphasize a zero-defect mentality, promotions that can be anticipated to the day regardless of an officer's competence, and an impersonal job assignments process as the leading issues with the personnel system.
When asked why they left, the number one response was "frustration with the military bureaucracy" which was cited by 82% of those surveyed. Only 63% felt that the high frequency of deployments was the main reason for leaving, placing it fifth on the list of most common reasons for leaving. 56 The question remains unanswered. Why do some officers choose to leave the Army while others decide to stay? A plausible conclusion that can be drawn is that when an officer's opportunity cost of leaving outweighs the expectations or benefits of remaining, they will depart. SSI explains this in detail defining opportunity cost as the value of an officer's next best employment alternative outside the Army. "Factors that may affect an officer's opportunity cost include unemployment rates, educational opportunities, potential civilian compensation, job satisfaction, and spousal employment opportunities." 57 Expectations of Military Service are those things that are attractive to remaining in the Army. Examples include current or anticipated job satisfaction and promotion potential, the value of retirement and insurance benefits, commissary privileges, the scope and quality of family medical care, and fully-funded educational opportunities for the officer and their family. 58 What's important to understand is each officer's opportunity costs and expectations are different; and that each officer will choose the option that is best for them. While the Army can do little about opportunity costs, it can greatly shape expectations. Failure to meet expectations -as a result of reduced budget reductions -will have a negative impact on officer retention.
Initiatives to Improve Officer Retention
Over time, the Army has implemented several initiatives to correct its officer shortage problem. While some were truly innovative and must be included in a future officer corps strategy for success, others have fallen miserably short of achieving their desired effects. The Army's earliest initiatives included: 1) accessing more lieutenants on active duty to compensate for under accessions and transformation; 2) reducing the time for promotions through the rank of major; and 3) increasing officer selection rates.
More recently, the Army has also offered several incentive programs in an attempt to meet accession numbers and increase retention rates. Finally the Army established the Officer Retention Branch in 2006 as part of a new campaign designed to retain more of its best officers. 59 Efforts from this campaign include a prototype Personnel Assignment system, an officer retention video and an officer retention website that, when coupled with command leadership, is intended to express to junior officers and their families just how important they are to the Army team. 60 61 To put it in perspective, the Army commissioned three lieutenants for every two openings and flooded the ranks to compensate for the loss of more senior captains. 62 The problem with over-accessing officers to compensate for low retention rates is that it actually puts additional downward pressures on retention. Wardynski, Lyle and Colarusso explain that as the Army has increased lieutenant production to replace talented captains lost to the private sector, the number of new officers waiting to fill a finite number of platoon leader and company executive officer positions has increased as indicated by Figure 5 .
Figure 5. Over-Accessing Officers is Undercutting Developmental Opportunities for Lieutenants
This creates a lengthy queue for these key developmental positions for which the Army is forced to reduce the time each officer can spend in them. "Lieutenants are given make-work duties that deflate career enthusiasm. The result is reduced experience in key leadership positions which yields increased dissatisfaction impairing the Army's ability to retain talent." 64 In an effort to grow captains and majors as quickly as possible, the Army reduced the time it takes to reach these ranks while also increasing selection rates. Lewis points out that before 1994, pin-on time to captain took about 54 months; in 1994 it dropped to 48 months; in 2000 it went to 42 months; and in 2002 it dropped even further to 38 months. 65 The time required to make major also decreased from a historical norm of 11 years to a pin-on time of 10 years.
LTG Rochelle explained to Congress that part of the Army's officer growth plan concerning captains and majors was increasing their promotion rates to yield a 95 -98% select rate. He pointed out that while promotion rates were high, the Army continued to select only the "best qualified" officers. 66 Lewis' findings run counter to the general's comments. "To compensate for captain attrition, the Army made compromises in the quality control procedures within the promotion process in order to promote more lieutenants each year." 67 In 1997, the selection rate to captain jumped significantly because the Army lowered its promotion selectivity standards from "best qualified" to "fully qualified." Additionally, in 1999, the Army began to retain captains who had twice been passed over for promotion to major. 68 In an effort to grow more senior captains and majors, the Army actually aided Why are so many officers advancing? The main reason is that too many officers continue to flee the service, including many of the best and brightest leaders. When selection opportunity gets too high, the competitive nature of the promotion system is diluted… Over time, quality will have to erode. Less competition can't mean anything else. 69 While the Army's plan of increasing accessions and selection rates for promotion coupled with reducing pin-on times for advancement to captain and major were focused on increasing retention, these were short term solutions to a long term problem that actually did more harm than good. SSI accurately points out that, "By accessing and promoting lower talent today, the Army pays a price in less competent officer leadership tomorrow, a problem that takes years to rectify." 70 Ranger school incurred a one-year ADSO, whereas language training incurred an ADSO of three-days for every one spent at school. The final two options allowed captains to select a different branch or functional area or to select their duty station of choice in exchange for a three-year ADSO. 73 The results of the first OMIP were less than encouraging falling short by more than 2000 officers. 74 Those who predominately took advantage of the program were those who needed no incentive to stay at all; 77% of eligible captains had previously indicated their intentions to stay on active duty beyond their initial ADSO. 75 With a cost to taxpayers of $500 million, Army G1 analysis of the program failed to find sufficient evidence that OMIP actually improved retention. officers who participated in OMIP selected, more than 93% chose a monetary bonus, while only 1.5% chose the graduate school option sending a mixed message between surveyed results to decisions made.
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A third reason why OMIP failed was officers' perception that there was "too much fine print" with the options presented in the program. At face value, the graduate school option seems attractive. However upon closer inspection, "officers will generally begin graduate school attendance between their 8 th and 12 th year of service" and "officers are required to study in an approved discipline." 79 These restrictions turned otherwise interested candidates away. 80 Taking lessons learned from the first offer, the Army opened a second OMIP in beyond their ADSO, then the Army was only 56% successful. 84 Second, most officers from year groups 1999 -2003 had already made the decision to stay beyond their ADSO, therefore incentive money offered to them was really money poorly spent. As the Army faces significant budget reductions, it must ensure that money is spent wisely.
Finally, while the Army achieved the numbers it was seeking, there was no effort made to target more talented officers with select incentives to stay. Of note, captains who had been selected below-the-zone for major -an event reserved for less than 10% of a year groups best officers -were ineligible to participate in OMIP, thus adding to the perception of rewarding mediocrity and failing to reward superior performance.
While OMIP served its purpose of retaining officers past their ADSO, the Army's
Officer Career Satisfaction Program (OCSP) is exactly the type of program the Army needs in a strategic officer plan. In 2006, the Army implemented the OCSP as a precommissioning program that offers Cadets their first branch of choice, assignment of choice, or a guarantee to attend a fully-funded graduate school in their 6 th -11 th year of service in exchange for an additional three-year ADSO. 85 The beauty of this program is that it focuses on officer quality and talent. Cadets compete before a board for selection ensuring the Army will retain its best officers for a minimum of three additional years.
Additionally, before OCSP many Cadets were unable to secure their branch or post of choice because branching and posting algorithms are based primarily on academic standing. "Over the past four years, however, more than 4,000 Cadets participated in OCSP to secure their branch or post of choice, guaranteeing the Army more than 12,000 obligated man-years of service at no cost to the Army." 86 This ensures the Army retains high quality officers because unlike the CSRB, the OCSP is not a reactive policy designed to entice everyone to stay. Instead it is squarely focused on a large, poorly retaining population with talents the Army deems critical. SSI points out that these officers are more likely to possess the conceptual and problem-solving talents demanded by jobs such as commander, executive officer, or operations officer and that their talent advantage grows as they move from company grade to field grade assignments. 87 Wardynski, Lyle and Colarusso champion OCSP as an investment in human capital. "The power of OCSP incentives to secure thousands of years of obligated service while simultaneously creating a more agile, satisfied, and educated officer corps is inarguable." 88 The program has the potential to increase continuation rates beyond ADSO currently at 47% to above 69% -levels the Army hasn't seen in its company grade officers since the 1980s. 89 Given impending budget cuts, OCSP is a program the Army cannot afford to sacrifice.
The Army's Officer Retention Branch is hard at work developing ways to retain more of its best officers. One of these initiatives is a prototype Personnel Assignment system that seeks not only to gain the input from the officer, but to make assignments based on the talents and skill sets of each individual. In Wardynski, Lyle and Colarusso's study on officer talent, they point out that the current Army personnel systems of an Officer Record Brief or Evaluation Reports lack the capability to track an officer's true talent. They offer that by creating a system to manage talent, it could have a dramatic impact on officer retention. "Effective talent management reinforces and links officer development, retention, and accessions programs. Assigning officers to positions leveraging their innate and acquired competencies can directly improve officer career satisfaction and success." 90 They continue that "It is in the best interest of both the Army and individual officers to match talents against requirements. The organization increases its productivity without increased costs, and the officer experiences enhanced productivity and job satisfaction without compromising his or her career." preferences and make choices that will better posture them for assignments they desire in the future. In short, the system is designed to use talent matching to make the Army more productive while providing officers with assignments that better fit their innate gifts.
This will lead to increased job satisfaction, which has direct implications for retention. 93 In a study conducted by ARI, findings revealed that junior officers are seeking outlets for guidance on the pros and cons of leaving the Army. While these officers should be able to discuss retention with their commanders, multiple barriers require the need for an additional outlet. 94 As a result, the Army Officer Retention Branch developed a retention video that seeks to target company grade officers approaching their ADSO. about having left when they did, and their willingness to advise current officers to at least consider thoughts about leaving." 96 Justification behind using this medium was four-fold: 1) to provide a realistic perspective on the pros and cons of leaving the service to combat the "grass is always greener" syndrome; 2) to highlight the benefits enjoyed by being an officer in the Army that may be taken for granted; 3) to get the true perspective of life in the corporate sector; and 4) as former members of the Army, they could be seen as less biased and more knowledgeable about the outside world than one's commander. 97 The Army interviewed 70 former officers representative of current demographics, ultimately settling on eight former officers and their spouses. The video was then screened by a focus group consisting of 155 company grade officers for their feedback.
Over 45% of the 155 officers said the video helped clarify the unique benefits of being an officer while more than one third (34%) said they would now take in account the positive aspects of being an officer when making career decisions. About 15% said that seeing the video actually increased the likelihood of their staying until retirement.
Over half wanted a formal program that would enable them to speak with former officers, and 41% said that they wanted their spouses to talk with former officers' spouses.
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A consensus among the focus group emerged that the video would be effective to spur conversation about officer retention, provided it was shown at the right time and in the right setting. For optimal results, the video would be most effective shown on an individual basis as a springboard to a discussion with the commander. Alternatively, most officers and all spouses felt that it would be effective to view it as a couple or with three or fewer couples with a discussion facilitator. Most felt this would spur conversation in a way that simply sitting down to talk could not. Afghanistan coming to a close, the country has already indicated its intent to cash in its "peace dividend." The Army must develop a comprehensive strategy for recruiting and retaining its junior officers if it is to correct its officer retention problem and set the conditions for an adequately manned and equally talented officer corps prepared to meet the challenges and demands of the future. At a minimum, the Army needs to establish a centralized accessions program; return to its historical percentages by commissioning source; and establish policies that establish a phased approach when looking at officer retention.
The 2007 GAO report points out that the Army's officer accession programs are decentralized and do not formally coordinate with one another, preventing the Army from effectively compensating for the shortfalls in some officer accession programs. 103 The Army must either consolidate its three commissioning sources under a single authority or within a fused command structure that ensures unity of effort if it is to set the conditions for an officer corps strategy for success in an era of reduced budgets. more highly-skilled applicants that can be accessed through further coordinated endeavors.
The Army needs to return to its historical percentages for officer production by source. "The rise in OCS from 9% of accessions prior to 1998 to nearly 40% of accessions in 2008 occurred first in the OCS-IS harvesting from among our NCO ranks.
When OCS-IS reached it maximum capacity, the Army expanded its OCS-EO program.
Since 2006, OCS-EO has comprised more than 60% of the OCS accessions." 107 If the Army is to return to ROTC producing 70% of the officer population, it must have the ability to attract applicants; that means scholarships. As SSI points out, the Army recently returned to a centralized scholarship selection process placing it back on par with Air Force and Navy scholarships. This gives ROTC greater flexibility in ensuring that high-potential talent stays in Army ROTC. 108 An officer corps strategy for the future must provide talented, quality officers in its ranks -and then retain them. SSI's study on retaining officer talent explains that retention requires far more than dramatic pay raises or other financial incentives. "First, it calls for a mutually reinforcing mix of sound accession, retention, development, and employment policies. longer. This program is expected to increase officer retention percentages back to near 70% while increasing the quality of officers serving. Phase II of SSI's career phase policy plan is from the end of an officer's ADSO to 10 years of service. As an officer approaches 10 years of service, the probability of remaining on active duty until retirement climbs to more than 80%. To get officers to this point; the Army must create positive expectations regarding continued employment within their talent set, selection to field grade rank, and the possibility of higher education goals. 111 Phase III is from 10 years to 20 years of service. Most officers beyond 10 years are committed to a 20-year or longer career and are interested in all the benefits that come with it. Phase IV is from 20 years of service to mandatory retirement. This is the phase where officers give back to the Army in terms of providing strategic talent. Service expectations shift markedly toward a desire to influence significant outcomes and to enjoy their work. The Army must guard against talent leakage as opportunity costs for these officers tend to rise due to their experiences and accomplishments, which are valued in the marketplace. 112 By instilling a mutually reinforcing mix of sound accession, retention, development, and employment policies, the Army will be taking a more proactive approach towards achieving an enterprising solution towards and officer corps strategy for recruiting and retention.
The Army will get smaller as a result of budget cuts, however that doesn't mean its officer corps has to re-learn the mistakes of the past. By developing an officer corps strategy for success, it will correct its officer retention problem, setting the conditions for an adequately manned and talented officer corps prepared to meet the challenges and
